

OLEKSANDR SHEPOTYLO

10 Vul. Voloska, Suite 406

Kyiv, Ukraine 04070

+38 (044) 492-8012 Ext. 121

E-mail: oshepotylo@eerc.kiev.ua

Webpage: www.econ.umd.edu/~shepotil

EDUCATION

Ph.D. Economics, University of Maryland at College Park, 2006

M.A. Economics, New Economic School, Moscow, Russia, 2000

M.A. Electrical Engineering, Moscow Power Engineering University, 1994

DISSERTATION

“Essays on the Effects of Institutions on Economic Outcomes.”

Committee: Peter Murrell (Chair), Harry Kelejian, John Chao

FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION

Primary: Econometrics, Institutional Economics, International Macroeconomics

Secondary: International Trade

PUBLICATIONS AND PAPERS

“Regional governance infrastructure: the positive externality effect on the inflow of foreign direct investment,” mimeo, University of Maryland. (First chapter of dissertation)

“The three-point-for-win rule in soccer: are there incentives for match fixing?” (Second chapter of dissertation) Under review at the *Journal of Sports Economics*.

“The Impact on Russia of WTO Accession and the Doha Agenda: the importance of liberalization of barriers against foreign direct investments in services for growth and poverty reduction,” T. Rutherford, D. Tarr, and O. Shepotylo, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3725

“The structure of import tariffs in Russia: 2001-2003,” in *Trade Policy and WTO Accession for Development in Russia and the CIS: A Handbook*, edited by David Tarr, in Russian, Moscow: Ves Mir, (with D. Tarr and T. Koudoyarov)

“Poverty Effects of Russia's WTO Accession: Modeling 'Real' Households and Endogenous Productivity Effects,” T. Rutherford, D. Tarr, and O. Shepotylo, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3473

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor, Intermediate Microeconomics, University of Maryland, Spring 2005

Teaching Assistant, Principles of Microeconomics, University of Maryland, Spring 2001–2004

RESEARCH/WORK EXPERIENCE

Assistant Professor and Senior Researcher EERC and KEI, Kyiv, Ukraine 2006-present

Consultant, World Bank (DEC RG Trade Unit), Washington D.C., 2003-2006

Processed survey data, worked with synthetic datasets, applied matching techniques, worked with general equilibrium models of trade, estimated welfare implications of Russia joining WTO, estimated a tariff regime for the Russian Federation, estimated a gravity model of intraregional trade in Russia, estimated income factor shares by applying perpetual inventory model of capital accumulation.

Research Assistant, Russian European Center for Economic Policy (RECEP) and New Economic School. Moscow, Russia 2000

Developed an economic model to decompose overall growth in inequality by differences in human capital, regional, structural, economic changes and studied dynamics of inequality.

AWARDS

Graduate Assistantship, University of Maryland, 2000 – 2005
Scholarship, New Economic School, Moscow, Russia 1999-2000
Fellowship, Moscow Power Engineering University 1989-1994

REFERENCES

Peter Murrell	University of Maryland	murrell@econ.umd.edu	(301) 405-3476
Harry Kelejian	University of Maryland	kelejian@econ.umd.edu	(301) 405-3492
David Tarr	World Bank	dtarr@worldbank.org	(202) 473-7677
Tom Rutherford	University of Colorado	rutherford@colorado.edu	(734) 424-3563

THESIS ABSTRACT

First Essay: Regional governance infrastructure: the positive externality on the inflow of foreign direct investment

Recent empirical studies have showed that building an effective governance infrastructure is key to the success of market-oriented reforms in transition economies. This paper shows that exogenous parameters such as regional governance infrastructure and geographic location are as important as local governance. Improvements in regional governance create a positive spillover effect that benefits each country in the region. This positive externality effect can be internalized by coordinating reforms and economic policies of countries in the region.

We look at net inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) as a measure of economic development and study the influence of local and regional governance infrastructure on FDI in 24 transition countries from 1993 to 2003. We set up an econometric panel data model that takes into account spatial spillovers and spatially correlated error terms. We further estimate the model applying a recently developed GMM three-stage procedure. We demonstrate that careful specification of the spatial error structure is important in estimating regression coefficients and confidence intervals.

Results show that regional governance infrastructure is an important determinant of FDI inflow. The regional spillover effect is both statistically significant and of the same order of magnitude as the local governance effect. Countries located in regions with poor governance infrastructure have difficulties in attracting foreign capital even if they follow a path of economic reforms and build market institutions. However, regional policy cooperation substantially improves their chances of success in transition.

Keywords: institutional economics, transition, spatial economics, econometrics

Second Essay: The three-point-for-win rule in soccer: are there incentives for match fixing?

In the middle of the 90's the European soccer body UEFA urged National Soccer Federations to award three points for a win in a match instead of two points, as under previous regulations. Soon, the new system was universally adopted by all countries. The purpose of this change was to discourage playing for a tie, since ties receive only one point each, and to encourage a more attractive, attacking style of play. While there is some evidence of success, the effects are not as big as was probably expected. The potential danger of the new rule is that it penalizes "quality" tied games and encourages teams to collude in order to maximize the expected number of points per game. This problem is especially relevant if teams can strategically interact during long tournaments, potentially leading to corruption and point trading. There is also evidence that the change in rules had heterogeneous effects on top clubs and lesser clubs. While top clubs began attacking more, lesser clubs emphasized defense even after the change in rules.

We develop a game theoretic model of strategic interactions between teams in a tournament that predicts that lesser clubs are more likely to collude if the probability of a draw is high or the expected punishment of being caught is low. We further test predictions of the model using a data set of soccer games in the USSR, Ukraine and Italy in 1980-2002. We apply a logit model that predicts the outcome of the current game as a function of the outcome of the previous game, controlling for the quality of each team. We find a statistically significant relationship between the outcomes of two games involving the

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same teams under the new rule in the Ukraine. However, we do not find such a relationship under the old rule or in the more competitive Italian league.

Keywords: game theory, sports economics, corruption, institutional economics

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Citizenship: Ukrainian (F-1 Visa) Gender: Male